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of lifetime lease at fair rental value to employee); Ltr.
Rul. 8812003, Dec. 17, 1987 (charitable deduction
allowed for transfer of farmland and equipment subject
to leases with option to purchase where rent was
adequate consideration for use of farmland and
equipment).
8 Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(e)(2)(iii).
9 Rev. Rul. 78-303, 1978-2 C.B. 122.
10 Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(e)(2)(ii).
11 Rev. Rul. 77-169, 1977-1 C.B. 286.
12 Ltr. Rul. 9347002, July 29, 1993.
13 Id.
14 Rev. Rul. 83-158, 1983-2 C.B. 159; Ltr. Rul. 8141037,
July 9, 1981.
15 Rev. Rul. 84-97, 1984-2 C.B. 196.
16 Estate of Blackford v. Comm’r, 77 T.C. 1246 (1981),
acq., 1983-2 C.B. 1.
17 Rev. Rul. 76-357, 1976-2 C.B. 285.
18 Rev. Rul. 87-37, 1987-1 C.B. 295 (charity given
undivided interest in personal residence donated to
charity as tenant in common with non charitable donee).
19 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 76-544, 1976-2 C.B. 288, revoked by
Rev. Rul. 87-37 (remainder interest held by charity and
individual as equal tenants in common).
20 I.R.C. § 2055(e)(3).
21 See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-12.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS .  Prior to filing
bankruptcy, the debtors fraudulently transferred their farm
homestead to third parties.  One of the debtors' creditors
filed suit in state court and received a judgment of
fraudulent transfer which was filed prior to the debtors'
bankruptcy filing.  In the bankruptcy case, the trustee also
moved for avoidance of the transfer as fraudulent.  The
trustee objected to the creditor's judgment lien claim against
the homestead, arguing that the judgment lien did not attach
to the property because the debtors did not have ownership
and possession of the property when the lien was recorded.
The court held that, under state law, the judgment attached
to the property when filed and remained a senior interest
against the property after the bankruptcy filing and during
the trustee's avoidance of the transfer.  In re Mathiason, 16
F.3d 234 (8th Cir. 1994), aff’g, 170 B.R. 662, aff’g,  129
B.R. 173 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991).
    CHAPTER 13   -ALM § 13.03.*
PLAN. The debtor had filed 11 years of “protest tax
returns” and paid federal income taxes only to the extent
withheld by the debtor’s employer. When the IRS attempted
to levy against the debtor’s wages, the debtor filed a Chapter
7 case and later a Chapter 13 case. The taxes were not
discharged in the first case and the second case was
dismissed. The debtor filed the current case again in an
attempt to stop the wage levy. The debtor’s plan proposed to
pay only the priority tax claims and a small portion of the
unsecured tax claims. The court held that the plan was not
proposed in good faith because the tax claims arose from the
frivolous tax returns. The court cited several precedents
upholding the principle that Chapter 13 could not be used as
part of a scheme to avoid paying taxes. In re Paulson, 170
B.R. 496 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIMS. The debtor originally
filed for Chapter 13 but converted the case to Chapter 7.
The IRS filed a claim for post-petition but pre-confirmation
taxes owed by the debtor. The debtor sought to have the IRS
claim be given administrative expense status to be paid from
the estate. The court held that only the entity possessing a
claim may file for administrative expense status of the
claim; therefore, the debtor could not affect the status of the
IRS claim. In re McNitt, 170 B.R. 706 (D. Idaho 1994).
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtor filed for Chapter 7
bankruptcy in March 1989 and gave notice to the IRS. In
April 1989, the IRS made a post-petition assessment of
taxes in violation of the automatic stay but the violation was
not challenged. The IRS also applied the debtor’s post-
petition tax refunds against the assessed tax liability. The
debtor sought avoidance of the assessment, recovery of the
refunds and sanctions. The IRS sought retroactive relief
from the automatic stay for the assessment and argued that
sanctions were not allowed because the IRS had not filed a
claim in the case. The court denied the IRS application for
retroactive relief from the automatic stay because the IRS
failed to show any circumstances warranting the relief. The
court held that the IRS had waived its immunity against suit
because the IRS had made the assessment and had offset the
refund against the assessment, in effect making a claim
against the debtor. In re Fingers, 170 B.R. 419 (S.D. Cal.
1994), aff’g, 148 B.R. 586 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1993).
OFFSET. When the debtor corporation filed for
bankruptcy, the IRS was in the process of auditing the
debtor’s past 13 taxable years. The IRS filed a claim for
taxes based on the audit which showed that the debtor had
underpaid taxes in some years and overpaid taxes in other
years, resulting in a net tax due. The IRS calculated the
amount due by offsetting refunds against taxes due
chronologically. The debtor’s plan provided for full
payment of federal taxes but barred any setoffs. The court
characterized corporate tax returns as fluctuating over
several years such that a corporation’s tax obligations over
several tax years could be grouped together into one long
tax period; therefore, the offsetting of refunds against
underpayments was not an impermissable setoff. The court
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referred to the interrelatedness of corporate tax returns over
several years due to carryforwards and carrybacks which
make any particular tax return adjustable by prior or
subsequent tax events. The application of the court’s
reasoning to this case is unclear because there is no mention
that the refunds or underpayments resulted from carryovers
or carrybacks of tax items. Pettibone Corp. v. U.S., 94-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,472 (7th Cir. 1994).
REFUNDS. The debtor had made various payments of
federal taxes from the closing of the debtor’s prior
bankruptcy case in 1985 through December 31, 1991. On
August 13, 1993, the debtor filed a claim for refund for
payments made from August 13 through December 31,
1991. The refund claim was based on the debtor’s argument
that several of the 1985 through 1991 payments were for
taxes discharged in the prior bankruptcy case, resulting in
the August through December 1991 payments being in
excess of the taxes owed. The IRS argued that the refund
claim was barred by the two year statute of limitations of
I.R.C. § 6511. The court held that the limitation applied
only to taxes paid more than two years before a refund claim
and not to the underlying cause of the excess payments;
therefore, the debtor’s refund claim was timely filed as to
payments made after August 13, 1991, even though the
reasons for the excess payments occurred prior to August
13, 1991. In re Howard Industries, Inc., 170 B.R. 358
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994).
CONTRACTS
DAMAGES. The plaintiff purchased peach trees from
the defendant and claimed that the trees were diseased when
purchased. The plaintiff sued for breach of contract, breach
of implied warranty of merchantability, breach of implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, negligence and
breach of a written contract for the benefit of a third party.
After the plaintiff presented evidence as to the loss of profits
and losses from the expense of replanting the trees, the
defendant moved for a nonsuit because the plaintiff
presented no evidence of the difference in the value of the
land with diseased trees as compared to healthy trees. The
defendant cited Posz v. Burchell, 25 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1962)
as holding that the only damages allowed for defective trees
was the loss of value to the land. The court held that the
damage limitation of Posz was incorrect and that where the
land was used as an orchard, damages could include lost
profits and other costs incurred because of the defective
trees. Serian Bros., Inc. v. Agri-Sun Nursery, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 382 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
DUMP. The defendant operated a farm in the town of
Wrentham. The defendant obtained a permit to raze two
chicken houses, conditioned on the defendant’s disposal of
the materials outside of the town of Wrentham. The
defendant removed all but 900 cubic yards of the materials
and the Wrentham board of health sought an injunction for
removal of the remaining refuse, arguing that the
defendant’s pile of refuse constituted an unapproved
dumping ground under Mass. Gen. Law ch. 111, § 150A.
The defendant argued that the pile was not a dumping
ground because no additional materials were added by the
defendant or by others. The court held that the definition of
dumping ground did not require additions of refuse or
dumping by others on the site; therefore, the injunction was
properly granted against the defendant. Board of Health of
Wrentham v. Hagopian, 638 N.E.2d 48 (Mass. Ct. App.
1994).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BORROWER’S RIGHTS-ALM § 11.01[2][g].*  The
defendants defaulted on a farm mortgage with the plaintiff.
The plaintiff provided the defendant with an opportunity to
apply for loan restructuring but denied the application as
incomplete and because the loan restructuring proposed
would not make the defendant’s farm viable. The defendant
sought an injunction against foreclosure based on the
plaintiff’s improper denial of the restructuring application in
that (1) the plaintiff’s review of the application indicated
that the application was sufficiently complete; (2) the loan
officer who initially denied the application was present at
the review committee session and had indicated that the
application would be denied, even before the application
had been submitted; and (3) the review committee used a
higher standard for the application than was required by the
regulations in that the committee required the defendant’s
operation to be viable after the restructuring. The trial court
held for the defendant on all three elements but the appellate
court reversed. The court held that the initial decision to
review the application did not waive the committee’s right
to reject the application for incompleteness because the
incompleteness was sufficient to prevent the committee
from reaching a conclusion. The court also held that the pre-
review statement by the loan officer did not affect the
validity of the review committee’s decision. The court also
held that the review committee used a higher standard
because the statute, 12 U.S.C. § 2202a(d)(1), required that
any restructuring be less expensive than foreclosure and
leave the debtor in a viable operating status. The court also
reviewed the right of a borrower to assert violations of the
regulation in defense of foreclosure. The court held that,
although the Agricultural Credit Act does not provide a
private right to enforce the Act’s provisions, a violation of
the regulations can be used as a defense to foreclosure.
Farm Credit Bank of Texas v. Sturgeon, 640 So.2d 666
(La. Ct. App. 1994).
The plaintiff applied for a loan to purchase a farm under
the Socially Disadvantaged Farm Ownership Program
(SDFOP) administered by the FmHA but the application
was denied, stating that the plaintiff did not meet the
program criteria. The plaintiff filed a suit under the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), claiming that the
application was denied because of the plaintiff’s race. The
court held that the ECOA did not contain an express waiver
of government immunity from suit; therefore, the court had
no jurisdiction to hear the claim. In the alternative, the court
held that the application was properly denied because the
plaintiff’s poor credit history was a sufficient reason for
denying the application. Moore v. U.S.D.A., 857 F. Supp.
507 (W.D. La. 1994).
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BRUCELLOSIS. The APHIS has issued interim rules
changing California from Class Free to Class A for purposes
of interstate movement of cattle under the brucellosis
regulations. 59 Fed. Reg. 47533 (Sept. 16, 1994).
The APHIS has adopted as final regulations providing
for payment at fair market value for whole herds of swine
depopulated by brucellosis. 59 Fed. Reg. 51102 (Oct. 7,
1994).
CROP INSURANCE-ALM § 13.04.* The FCIC has
announced that for the 1995 crop year only, the date for
acceptance of applications for small grains, sugarcane,
potatoes and nursery crop insurance has been extended to
October 31, 1994. 59 Fed. Reg. 50559 (Oct. 4, 1994).
HORSES. The APHIS has issued proposed regulations
governing interstate movement of horses testing positive for
equine infectious anemia. Interstate movement directly to
slaughter will be allowed under a permit and a sealed
conveyance instead of official prior identification and
branding. 59 Fed. Reg. 50860 (Oct. 6, 1994).
MIGRANT AGRICULTURAL LABOR-ALM §
3.04.* The plaintiffs were migrant Haitian Creole farm
workers who were hired by contractors in Florida to work
on the defendant’s farm in New York. The plaintiffs failed
to show that the defendant hired the contractors to recruit
the plaintiffs; however, once the workers arrived on the
defendant’s farm, the plaintiffs were provided some work.
The contractors were not registered under MSAWPA. The
workers were not provided with housing and were
transported to the field by one of the contractors who did not
have a valid license to transport agricultural workers. The
defendant did not maintain wage and work records on the
plaintiffs and did not provide any records to the plaintiffs.
The plaintiff also claimed that the defendant had promised
certain types of work at certain wages and had promised
housing for family members. The defendant argued that the
workers were not protected by MSAWPA because the
workers had no permanent residence. The court held that the
plaintiffs normally resided in Florida where they were
recruited; therefore, the plaintiffs were covered by
MSAWPA. The court also held that the failure of the
defendant to provide adequate housing, wage and work
records and licensed transportation for the plaintiffs were
violations of MSAWPA. The court held that the plaintiffs
failed to prove that the defendant had made specific work
and housing promises to the contractors; therefore, no
violation occurred. The defendant, however, was held to
have violated MSAWPA for failing to determine whether
the contractors were registered under MSAWPA. The court
awarded $500 per violation per plaintiff because the
defendant’s similar past violations of MSAWPA
demonstrated that the violations were knowing and
intentional. Avila v. A. Sam & Sons, 856 F. Supp. 763
(W.D. N.Y. 1994).
The plaintiffs were migrant workers who picked beans
on the defendant’s farm. The plaintiffs were hired by a farm
labor contractor who was in turn hired by the defendant to
obtain harvesters. The defendant indicated to the contractors
which fields were to be picked on any day and set the per
box payment rate, but the contractors completely supervised
the actual picking. Some of the plaintiffs were injured in an
automobile accident while being transported to one of the
defendant’s field and alleged several violations of the
MSAWPA. Defendant argued that the MSAWPA did not
apply because the plaintiffs were not employed by the
defendant and that the defendant qualified for the small
business exception in that the defendant did not employ
migrant workers for more than 500 man-hours during the
preceding year. The plaintiffs argued that the contractor and
defendant were joint employers, subjecting the defendant to
MSAWPA. The court held that the defendant was not a joint
employer subject to MSAWPA because (1) the defendant
did not control the work of harvesting, (2) could not modify
the employment conditions of the workers, (3) did not pay
the workers, and (4) did not prepare the payroll. The
defendant’s control over the per box rate and selection of
the fields to be picked were held insufficient to make the
defendant a joint employer. In dicta, the court stated that the
defendant did not qualify for the small business exception
because the defendant failed to provide sufficient work
records to demonstrate the number of man-hours performed
by migrant workers in the previous year. Charles v.
Burton, 857 F. Supp. 1574 (M.D. Ga. 1994).
The plaintiff was a migrant farm laborer who harvested
melons on the defendants’ farms. The plaintiff was hired by
a registered farm labor contractor who was hired by one of
the defendants. The other defendant did not hire the
contractor nor did that defendant hire the plaintiff. The
plaintiff was injured while riding in a truck owned and
driven by the contractor and filed suit for violations of
MSAWPA, including wage and recordlkeeping violations
and vehicle safety violations. The defendants argued that
they were not agricultural employers covered by MSAWPA
because they did not hire the plaintiff nor were they joint
employers because the plaintiff’s work was under the
primary control of the contractor. The court held that the
defendants were not subject to MSAWPA because the
contractor had complete control over the plaintiff’s work
and the plaintiff was hired solely by the contractor. The
plaintiff also asserted that one defendant failed to insure that
the contractor had registered the truck involved in the
accident. The court held that the defendant had taken
reasonable steps to determine that a bus used by the
contractor for transporting workers was registered but was
under no duty to insure that all vehicles which could be used
by the contractor were safe. Ricketts v. Vann, 32 F.3d 71
(4th Cir. 1994).
PEANUTS. The CCC has adopted as final the 1994
peanut crop national support level of $678.36 per short ton
for quota peanuts and $132.00 per short ton for additional
peanuts. The minimum CCC export sale price for additional
edible peanuts is $400 per short ton. 59 Fed. Reg. 47528
(Sept. 16, 1994).
W O O L . The CCC has issued interim regulations
providing that in determining net proceeds for shorn wool
and mohair, marketing charges for commissions, curing or
grading are not to be deducted, effective for 1993 and later
marketing years. The interim rules also remove the 1
percent assessment on 1993, 1994, and 1995 marketings. 59
Fed. Reg. 47530 (Sept. 16, 1994).
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FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].* In 1963, a decedent’s will established a trust for
the decedent’s sister’s son. The son was a cotrustee with two
other family members but could not exercise any authority
over discretionary income or principal distributions. The
two other trustees exercised their discretionary powers to
distribute the trust principal to a new trust which was
identical to the old trust except that the situs of the trust was
changed to Illinois where all the other aspects of the trust
were located. The IRS ruled that the distribution to the new
trust would not subject either trust to GSTT. Ltr. Rul.
9438023, June 27, 1994.
IRA. The taxpayers, husband and wife, entered into an
agreement under which an IRA held in the name of the
husband only and which was community property was split
into two IRAs, one for each spouse.  For each trust, the
other spouse was named as primary beneficiary and a trustee
was named as secondary beneficiary of the IRA. The trustee
had the power to allocate trust funds to two trusts, a marital
trust and an unified credit trust. Upon the death of the first
spouse to die, the surviving spouse intended to disclaim the
beneficiary portion of the IRA which would pass to the
trusts as allocated by the trustee. The IRS ruled (1) the
partition of the IRA would not be a taxable distribution, (2)
the partition of the IRA would not be a taxable gift, and (3)
the portion of the first deceased spouse’s IRA disclaimed by
the surviving spouse which passed to the unified credit trust
would not be included in the surviving spouse’s estate. Ltr.
Rul. 9439020, July 7, 1994.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
taxpayers, husband and wife, each established a revocable
trust. The husband was the beneficiary of his trust and the
wife was the beneficiary of her trust. Both parties were
cotrustees of the trusts but each grantor could act separately
as to his or her own trust. At the death of a grantor, that
grantor’s trust was to be split into three trusts: (1) a trust for
the surviving spouse and the grantor’s descendants funded
with sufficient property to make full use of the unified credit
amount, (2) a marital trust for the surviving spouse for
which a QTIP election was made and (3) a marital trust for
the surviving spouse for which a QTIP election was not
made. If the surviving spouse disclaimed any of the second
trust, the disclaimed portion was to be included in the first
trust. The surviving spouse was to receive all the net income
of the second and third trusts and has a testamentary power
of appointment of the trust principal. The trustee of the
second and third trusts had the power to distribute principal
to the surviving spouse for the spouse’s health, education,
support and maintenance and the spouse had the power to
withdraw up to the greater of 5 percent of the trust principal
or $5,000  annually on a noncumulative basis. The IRS
ruled that the second trust would qualify for the marital
deduction if the QTIP election was made and the first trust
would not be included in the estate of the surviving spouse.
Ltr. Rul. 9438020, June 27, 1994.
TRANSFERS WITHIN THREE YEARS OF
DEATH-ALM § 5.02[2].The decedent signed a power of
attorney appointing a son as attorney-in-fact. The decedent
made many gifts and other estate planning transactions up to
the period of incompetency in March 1987. The son made
several gifts from the decedent’s property until the
decedent’s death in April 1987. In 1992, the state passed a
law authorizing attorneys-in-fact to make gifts in
accordance with the principal’s history of lifetime gifts. The
court held that the state law applied retroactively and held
that the late transfers were not included in the decedent’s
gross estate as revocable transfers. Est. of Ridenour v.
Comm’r, 94-2  U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,180 (4th Cir.
1994), aff’g,  T.C. Memo. 1993-41.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
C CORPORATIONS
NET OPERATING LOSSES.  The taxpayer/debtor
corporation acquired another corporation in order to obtain a
group of department stores to add to a national chain of
department stores.  The debtor operated the new stores for
three years and then liquidated the acquired corporation.
The stores were operated for three more years before the
stores were sold.  The debtor made use of net operating
losses of the acquired corporation after liquidating the
acquired corporation but the IRS disallowed the losses
under I.R.C. §§ 269, 382.  The court held that the net
operating losses would be allowed because the debtor did
not have a tax avoidance purpose in acquiring the
corporation and continued in the same business as the
acquired corporation.  Matter of Federated Dept. Stores,
Inc., 170 B.R. 331 (S.D. Ohio 1994), aff’g, 135 B.R. 962
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992).
STOCK INVERSIONS. The IRS has announced that it
will issue regulations governing the tax consequences of
stock inversion between related corporations. The new
regulations are include either (1) recognition of gain from
the exchange of stock or (2) reduction in basis of the
exchanged stock, to eliminate the tax benefits from a stock
exchange between related corporations. Notice 94-93,
I.R.B. 1994-41.
CASH TRANSACTIONS . The IRS has issued
proposed regulations governing the presumption of
ownership of large amounts of cash or cash equivalents
where the owner is not otherwise identified. The proposed
regulations also add several items to the definition of cash
equivalents. 59 Fed. Reg. 49613 (Sept. 29, 1994).
CASUALTY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].*  The taxpayer
corporation operated several timberlands which were
infected with southern pine beetles. Although the beetles
were always present in the timberlands, in several tax years,
the beetles caused major damage to the taxpayer’s timber.
The court held that because an infestation of beetles can kill
a tree within days, the infestation at epidemic proportions
was a deductible casualty loss. The court held, however, that
the taxpayer was not entitled to any deduction because the
taxpayer’s records were insufficient to prove the amount of
loss.  The taxpayer also had several forests destroyed by
fires and one tract destroyed by the eruption of Mount St.
Helens. The court held that the fires and eruption were
casualty events allowing the taxpayer a deduction for the
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loss of trees. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S., 94-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) (Fed. Cl. 1994).
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS-ALM §
4.02[14].* The taxpayer’s employment was terminated and
the company offered the taxpayer a higher termination
settlement if the taxpayer signed a release of all claims
against the company. The taxpayer signed the release and
sought to exclude the settlement payment as a personal
injury settlement payment. The court held that because the
release involved all claims against the company, the
taxpayer could not show that the settlement was received for
any injury to the taxpayer and the settlement must be
included in the taxpayer’s taxable income. Taggi v. U.S.,
94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,470 (2d Cir. 1994), aff’g,
835 F. Supp. 744 (S.D. N.Y. 1993).
The taxpayers were commercial salmon fishers who
reached a settlement with Exxon Corp. for damages
resulting from the Exxon Valdes oil spill. The court held
that the settlement proceeds were includible in the
taxpayers’ gross income because the proceeds did not
compensate the taxpayers for personal injuries.  Every v.
Comm’r, 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,478 (W.D.
Wash. 1994).
DEDUCTIONS. Readers should note that the deduction
for 25 percent of health insurance costs by self-employed
persons expired after 1993 and has not yet been extended
for 1994.
DEPRECIATION. The IRS has adopted as final
regulations governing the election for maintaining general
asset accounts for groups of depreciable assets for the
purpose of claiming depreciation for the assets in each
account. The final regulations make several changes in the
eligibility requirements for general asset accounts and are
effective for assets placed in service in taxable years ending
on or after October 7, 1994. 59 Fed. Reg. 52350 (Oct. 8,
1994).
HOBBY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].*  The taxpayers
operated a cattle farm in addition to other employment.  The
court held that the taxpayers could not deduct any expenses
in excess of farm income because the farm was not operated
with the intent to make a profit. The court cited the
taxpayer’s lack of experience in cattle farming, the lack of
separate business records, the lack of sales and the
taxpayer’s small amount of time spent on the business. The
taxpayers were also not allowed deductions for the costs of
rehabilitating some buildings which were to be rented to
others because the rental business was still in the
development stage.  Lombard v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1994-154.
PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[3].*  The
IRS has adopted as final regulations governing the
definition of "activity" for purposes of applying the
limitation on passive activity losses and credits.  The
regulations are a substantial revision of the temporary
regulations previously issued, Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-
4T.  The regulations are effective only for taxable years
ending on or after May 10, 1992, although a taxpayer may
elect to apply the temporary election rules for any taxable
year which included May 10, 1992.
A trade or business activity is defined as a trade or
business as defined in I.R.C. § 162, an activity conducted in
anticipation of the commencement of a trade or business,
and an activity involving research or experimental
expenditures deductible under I.R.C. § 174.  A trade or
business activity does not include rental activities treated
under Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-1T(e)(3)(vi)(B) as
incidental to holding property for investment. Treas. Reg. §
1.469-4(b)(1).
One or more trade or business activities or rental
activities may be grouped as a single activity if the activities
constitute an economic unit for the measurement of gain or
loss under I.R.C. § 469.  In determining whether activities
may be grouped together, a taxpayer may use any
reasonable method of applying the relevant facts and
circumstances.  The regulations provide a nonexclusive list
of factors for grouping activities:
(1) similarities and differences in the types of
businesses;
(2) extent of common control;
(3) extent of common ownership;
(4) geographical location; and
(5) interdependence of the activities.
Treas. Reg. § 1.469-4(c)(2).
A rental activity may not be grouped with another trade
or business activity unless (1) either activity is insubstantial
in relation to the other or (2) each owner of the trade or
business has the same proportionate ownership in the rental
activity, in which case only the rental activity with the trade
or business may be grouped with the trade or business.
Treas. Reg. § 1.469-4(d)(1).  A rental activity involving
real property may not be grouped with a rental activity
involving personal property, except where the rental of
personal property is included in the rental of the real
property. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-4(d)(2).
A limited partner may not group an activity described in
I.R.C. § 465(c)(1) or in a revenue procedure issued under
the proposed regulations, unless the partner is also a limited
partner in the other activity or the grouping is appropriate
under the facts and circumstances test.  Treas. Reg. §
1.469-4(d)(3).
Activities involving a C corporation, S corporation or
partnership are to be grouped by the C corporation, S
corporation or partnership first, then the shareholders or
partners may make their own groupings based upon their
personal involvement with other activities by other entities.
Treas. Reg. § 1.469-4(d)(3).
Once activities have been grouped together for purposes
of the passive activity rules, the activities may not be
regrouped unless the original grouping was inappropriate or
a material change makes the original grouping
inappropriate.  Treas. Reg. § 1.469-4(e)(2). 59 Fed. Reg.
50485 (Oct. 4, 1994).
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
ACCOUNTING METHOD. The IRS has adopted as
final regulations describing the the events which trigger the
recapture of LIFO benefits under I.R.C. § 1363(d) when a C
corporation elects to become an S corporation or to merge
with an S corporation in a tax-free reorganization. 59 Fed.
Reg. 51105 (Oct. 7, 1994), adding Treas. Reg. § 1.1363-2.
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ELECTION. The corporation’s Subchapter S election
was not allowed because the shareholders failed to prove the
timely mailing of a complete Form 2553 or receipt by the
IRS. The form was also incomplete in that it had no attached
written consent by all shareholders and the form was not
signed by all shareholders. The shareholders were assessed
penalties for negligence for claiming deductions from the
corporation losses before receiving notice that the
Subchapter S election was approved. Huff v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1994-477.
SOCIAL SECURITY TAX. The Social Security
Domestic Employment Reform Act of 1994 has been passed
and signed into law increasing to $1,000 (to be adjusted
annually for inflation) the annual wage threshold for
reporting and paying social security taxes.
NEGLIGENCE
OPEN AND OBVIOUS. The plaintiff was injured
while working as a grain inspector inspecting grain in the
defendant’s grain storage facility. The plaintiff tripped on a
tarpaulin used to catch scattered grain from a conveyor. The
jury had awarded the plaintiff damages but the trial court
entered judgment NOV for the defendant based on its
interpretation of a recent Mississippi Supreme Court
decision, McGovern v. Scarborough, 566 So.2d 1225 (Miss.
1990), that an open and obvious danger is a complete
defense to a negligence claim on that danger. The court held
that McGovern did not hold that an open and obvious
danger was a complete defense to negligence but that
comparative negligence was the standard to be applied.
Because the jury found some negligence by the defendant,
the jury award should have been allowed. Tharp v. Bunge
Corp., 641 So.2d 20 (Miss. 1994).
PRODUCT LIABILITY
FUNGICIDE. The plaintiff was a watermelon grower
who purchased a fungicide manufactured by the defendant
for use on the melons. After the fungicide was applied, the
melons suffered burns and became unmarketable. The
plaintiff sued for negligence for failure to warn about the
burning, breach of express warranty, and strict liability.  The
defendant argued that the claims were preempted by FIFRA
because the claims were all based on a failure of the label to
warn about the possible burning of plants. The court held
that the breach of warranty and strict liability claims were
not preempted by FIFRA because the claims were based on
the defective nature of the fungicide in failing to work
without harming the melons. The plaintiff argued that the
negligence for failure to warn claim was not preempted by
FIFRA because the claim was based on the failure of the
defendant to warn about the burning once a history of
problems arose, even when the fungicide was applied
according to the label instructions. The court held that
precedents had established that any claim based on failure to
warn was preempted by FIFRA; therefore, the negligence
claim was not allowed. ISK Biotech Corp. v. Douberly,
640 So.2d 85(Fla. Ct. App. 1994).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
PRIORITY. The plaintiff bank loaned money to the
debtor to purchase cattle from the defendants who also took
a note for a portion of the purchase price. An agreement
between the parties stipulated that the bank would have a
priority security interest in the cattle. The bank filed its
security interest first. During the loan period, the bank
loaned additional money to the debtor until the debtor filed
for bankruptcy. The bank obtained the cattle from the
bankruptcy trustee and sold them. The defendant argued that
it had a priority security interest in the cattle proceeds
because the additional money loaned by the bank to the
debtor extinguished the original loan covered by the security
agreement with the bank. The District Court had held that
the after-acquired property clause of the security agreement
was sufficient to continue the security interest in the cattle
as to the additional amount loaned to the debtor. The
appellate court disagreed but held that a clause in the
agreement stating that the security agreement “is to secure
payment and performance of the liabilities and obligations
of debtor to secured party of every kind and description due
or to become due, now existing or hearafter arising,” was
sufficient to extend the security interest to future advances.
Farmers Nat’l Bank v. Shirey, 878 P.2d 762 (Idaho
1994).
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
ADMINISTRATIVE INSPECTIONS. The defendant
challenged the authority of the Maine Department of
Agriculture, Food and Rural Resources to conduct
warrantless inspections of the defendant’s potato packing
operation pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. § 956. The defendant
agreed that the first two tests of New York v. Burger, 482
U.S. 691 (1987) were met but argued that the third test was
not met because the inspection program lacked sufficient
safeguards. The court held that the inspection program had
sufficient safeguards in limiting the time, place and manner
of the inspections. The court held that the unlimited number
of inspections was important to the ability of the program to
enforce its requirements. The court noted that the inspection
program had been in place for over 60 years without
problems and that Maine potato packers have long been on
notice that they were subject to random warrantless searches
without notice. State v. McGillicuddy, 646 A.2d 354 (Me.
1994).
BEES. The defendant maintained an artificial beehive
on the defendant’s property. A state wildlife officer visited
the defendant and confirmed that an artificial beehive was
kept on the property and requested that the defendant
register the beehive with the state under Ohio Code §
909.01(D). When the defendant failed to register, the officer
obtained a search warrant to inspect the hive, finding some
dead bees and the presence of tracheal mites. The defendant
was fined $10 and assessed the $5 registration cost and
other court costs. The defendant argued that the statute did
not apply because the bees were not kept for commercial
purposes; therefore, the registration was not a proper
exercise of the state’s police power. The court held that
because bees were an important element of the agricultural
process, the registration of beehives, commercial and
noncommercial, was a valid exercise of the state’s police
power. State v. Williamson, 638 N.E.2d 169 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1994).
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CONSERVATION. The plaintiff was a farm
corporation which had entered a portion of its farmland in
the federal Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and
established a tree farm on the CRP acres. After the tree
farm was established, Missouri enacted the Wildlife Habitat
Improvement Program (WHIP) which provided for
additional funds for conservation practices instituted by
land owners. The WHIP and CRP programs overlapped
such that landowners could obtain funds from both
programs for the same conservation practice. The plaintiff
applied for funds from WHIP for a portion of the costs of
establishing the tree farm, but the application was denied by
the county water conservation district because the plaintiff
did not incur any costs after the WHIP was instituted. The
plaintiff argued that the application should have been
approved because all statutory requirements were met and
the district had no discretion to deny the application. The
court held that under the state soil and water commission’s
regulations, the district had the authority to deny the
application if the funds were to be used for past expenses.
The plaintiff argued that the regulation requirement was
contrary to the statutory authority of the commission to
issue regulations. The court held that the statute gave the
commission broad powers to promulgate regulations
implementing the statutory program. State v. Scott, 880
S.W.2d 908 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
CITATION UPDATES
Hendricks v. Comm’r, 32 F.3d 94 (4th Cir. 1994),
aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1993-396 (hobby losses) see p. 142
supra.
Est. of Klosterman v. Comm’r, 32 F.3d 402 (9th Cir.
1994), aff’g, 99 T.C. 313 (1992) (special use valuation) see
p. 116 supra.
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